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granted the motion to the extent the complaint sought monetary
damages against the Officials acting in their official capacity and to the
extent the complaint sought to require the Officials to comply with
Wyoming state law. The court denied the Officials' motion in all other
respects.
Staci A. McComb

Ozark Soc'y v. Melcher, 229 F. Supp. 2d 896 (E.D. Ark. 2002) (denying
defendant's motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction,
holding that defendant's issuance of conditioned dam construction
permit was a final agency action; plaintiffs had standing to bring suit
against defendant; and plaintiffs' claims were ripe).
This case arose when several river advocacy groups ("Ozark
Society") sued the United States Army Corps of Engineers ("Corps").
The Ozark Society claimed the Corps, in issuing a conditioned
construction permit for a dam on Arkansas' Bear Creek, failed to
follow certain procedural mandates. These mandates were found in
the Buffalo National River enabling legislation, the National
Environmental Policy Act, and the Federal Water Pollution and
Control Act. The Corps filed a motion to dismiss for lack of subject
matter jurisdiction, alleging that: (1) no final agency action had
occurred; (2) the Ozark Society lacked standing to bring this suit; and
(3) Ozark Society's claims were not yet ripe. The District Court for the
Eastern District of Arkansas disagreed with each of the Corps'
allegations and denied the motion to dismiss.
Under the Administrative Procedure Act ("APA"), only final
agency actions are subject to judicial review. On August 3, 2001, the
Corps issued a permit to the Searcy County Regional Water District
("Searcy County") for construction of a dam on Bear Creek.
Generally, the issuance of such a permit is a final agency action.
However, the Corps conditioned the permit given to Searcy County,
requiring further action by the Corps, other federal agencies, and
Searcy County before construction could begin. The conditions had
not yet been met at the time of this suit. The Corps argued that a final
agency action would only occur upon fulfillment of these conditions,
as until then the permit could still be revoked for noncompliance.
However, the court held that it is issuance of a permit, not the meeting
of attached conditions, which comprises a final agency action. As the
Corps issued the permit, it had taken a judicially reviewable final
action.
The Corps also argued that the Ozark Society lacked standing
because it had not yet suffered an injury in fact, and because its
injuries were not redressable by the court. In support, the Corps
noted that the proposed dam might never be built. However, the
court stated that the procedural requirements ensured that any
proposed dam would not have an adverse effect, either on Bear Creek
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or further downstream. The Ozark Society frequently enjoyed the
waters downstream from the proposed dam site. Essentially, the
procedural requirements ensured that people in Ozark Society's
position were considered when dam construction was proposed. By
alleging the procedures were not followed, the Ozark Society alleged
an injury in fact-the Corps' failure to consider the impact of the dam
upon Ozark Society when it was approved. Furthermore, the court
found this injury redressable, noting that under the APA, courts have
the ability to set aside agency actions, findings, or conclusions. Thus,
the court held that the Ozark Society had standing to bring this suit.
The Corps also argued that the Ozark Society's claims were not yet
ripe, again because the dam might never be built. However, the court
pointed out that the cause of the Ozark Society's injuries was the
Corps' failure to follow proper procedure, not the (speculative)
construction of the dam itself. These injuries had already occurred,
thus suits based on these injuries were ripe for review.
The Corps had taken a final agency action. The Ozark Society had
standing to bring a suit for injuries arising from that action, and any
such claims were ripe for review. Accordingly, the court denied the
Corps' motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.
James Siegesmund
Knaust v. City of Kingston, 193 F. Supp 2d. 536 (N.D.N.Y. 2002)
(holding that lack of ownership rights to water in subterranean caves
without proof of actual or imminent injury to reasonable use rights is
insufficient to establish standing).
Mark and Barbara Knaust ("Knausts") sought injunctive relief
and compensatory damages against the City of Kingston ("City") in the
United States District Court for the Northern District of New York,
alleging Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment takings, as well as state law
causes of action, including New York State Environmental Quality
Review Act violations and common law nuisance. The Knausts claimed
that storm water originating on the adjacent City of Kingston-funded
Business Park contaminated water in subterranean caves beneath their
property, interfered with their reasonable use, and constituted a
taking. In an earlier decision, the New York State Supreme Court,
Ulster County held that the Knausts owned the caves and rights to use
the water, but not the water itself. The district court initially denied
the Knausts' motion for a preliminary injunction to prevent the
Business Park's construction, because absent evidence that their
property suffered a physical invasion, they could not demonstrate
injury in fact sufficient to support standing. The United States Second
Circuit Court of Appeals dismissed the Knausts' appeal on this issue,
and on remand, the City contended that the Knausts failed to establish
standing, and that even if they could, the City nevertheless deserved
summary judgment. The Knausts' failure to show the Business Park

